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DISPATCH NO. EASA-225

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SE

DATE: 24 October 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/GROOVY

SPECIFIC— GROSSBAHN - Dr. Anton BHM

Ref: EASA-205

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Attached is a memorandum from GROSSBAHN further analyzing the implications of the BHM relationship with WILLI HOETTL. We second GROSSBAHN's plea in paragraph six of his memorandum; there is no question of GROSSBAHN's present urgent need for him, and we do not believe a serious security situation is involved. GROSSBAHN definitely has BHM sealed off from information which might do GROSSBAHN's operations serious damage, and we are as yet still convinced that BHM has no mischievous intentions in this regard. Please be sure, however, that we will continue the watch and the investigation.

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FORM NO. 51-28A
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2 December 1952

SUBJECT: CC-2

1. Late last spring CC 2 remarked to me that he had received and turned down an offer from "Rheinischer Merkur" - a weekly Cologne political newspaper, that allegedly is ADENAUER's house-paper - to become its political editor. Already previously he had informally told me that he had written a number of articles for the Merkur. From further side-remarks I learned from CC 2 that Herr Roegel, the chief editor of Merkur was in contact with him and had also visited him sometime during the summer in Altmünster.

2. On 27 November 1952 I had planned to go by train to Gmunden together with CC 2; I had however taken an earlier train to Attnang and there met CC 2 with whom I travelled together to Gmunden, where I left the train whereas CC 2 went on to Altmünster. During this trip CC 2 did not make the least remark that he was pressed for a conversation with me in privacy. On the morning of 29 November I received the letter from CC 2, dated 28 November, by ordinary mail. I was completely surprised by CC 2 giving me notice that he intended to leave on 31 January 1953. In accordance with the instructions that I had received, I had not mentioned or hinted anything regarding ~~the existing suspicion of~~ CC 2's connection with Hoettl.

3. I next saw CC 2 on Monday, 1 December 1952, when I briefly confirmed verbally the receipt of his letter and at the same time informed him that I was not ready to discuss this problem with him. CC 2, upon this occasion, tried to open a conversation on this topic but I declined by telling him that I would have to discuss the matter first with my friends. On 2 December he again tried to discuss the matter but I told him that I would prefer to delay a discussion. On this occasion I told him that I was not pleased at all since his leaving would create contact difficulties especially with HH 1. CC 2 replied that HH 1 could easily be handled by anybody else, and probably better than by him because he was aware that he was somehow to soft-pedalled.

4. CC 3 had informed me during last week that a phone call from Cologne had come for CC 2 after he had left for Altmünster the weekend before; the people in Cologne seemed nervous and annoyed that CC 2 was not in Salzburg. Some days before CC 3

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had told me that CC 2 had made a remark to her that he was frequently going to Freilassing to send his mail off from there. In reasoning he had first said that he thereby could evade the censorship in Austria, immediately afterwards, as it occurred to CC 3 with the intention to make this statement unsaid, he went on and explained that mailing letters to inner-Germany speeded the delivery up considerably.

5. On the afternoon of 2 December I briefly asked CC2 whether he intended to move to Cologne with his family - he had briefly told me that "he was forced" to take up a position in Germany with the Merkur, not explaining why he acted under "force" - he replied that for the first half year he would leave his family in Austria and possibly then move them too. He further remarked that he intended to remain in Germany for possibly two years until grass had grown over the knowledge that he had been in intelligence, he then intended to return to Austria.

6. The motivation for CC 2's decision at this time is not known to me, I intentionally have not asked him now. From previous occurrences it does not seem impossible that he intends to break off his connections with his present girl friend - he has the habit of always having a permanent girlfriend apart from his family - and in desiring to do so needs a complete change. Undoubtedly he dislikes the work that I have presently assigned to him and especially the way how I make him do this work; he considers it too bureaucratic. Although he is a hard worker, he craves for "freedom" which I would rather style uncontrolled disorganization. I found it especially hard to enforce the writing of contact reports, and he only very reluctantly gave in. From that time on - to my belief - he commenced to be as evasive as possible. It seems to me to be true that he hoped for a revival of political reporting which suits his prolixity and unpreciseness far better. He certainly also felt, at least for all the time since we commenced reporting in English, that he could not fully succeed. Since he suffers from an inferiority complex which he in front of others usually overrides by some pompousness in an intellectual way, the final motivation may also be found here. He also had hoped for an improvement of his income with us - he is by no means materially disinterested - and was disillusioned that such increase never came up. Finally my way of handling him in "a-matter-of-fact-way" might have gotten on his nerves. I have often felt that he would have kicked if he had dared to, but here his inferiority complex and lack of personal courage stopped him; knowing this, I made the mistake of feeling too superior.

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7. I do not earnestly believe that CC 2 will become a major security risk, especially not after we are through with him. The following security questions must however be taken into consideration:

a- Connections that he personally held:

Permanent connection with HH 1, whereby he knows all details of this operation;

permanent contact with the leading committee of the Austrian Catholic Action, especially with MAUER and SCHULMEISTER, this contact is build up on his personal connection and may necessarily cease;

permanent contact with Landeshauptmann KLAUS, I hope that it will be possible to take this contact over personally;

permanent contact with Archbishop ROHRACHER through his secretary which was arranged upon my suggestion by EE 1 for CC 2, this contact can change hands at any time;

assisting me in permanent contact with PP 1 and PP 3 - here he only also knew of PP 5 but of no other sources, except that a liaison existed to the Ministry for Interior in Vienna; I believe that he would be scared to disturb this connection;

✓ former permanent contact with MAUTE, a co-editor with "Presse" Vienna, which connection was dropped over two years ago.

b- Connections that he knew of:

He met AA 1 on four occasions at my house in 1949 and knows that this connection still exists. He is not aware of the other members identity;

he knows that XX 1 was working for me until recently;

he has seen SLAA contacting me on several occasions;

he knows of an existing contact with EE 1 but does not know of its extent or value;

he originally was in contact with van CUTSEM, but this connection stopped over two years ago, after he did not succeed in developing this source.

c- Access to office files:

He originally had access to a cover number list (three years ago) but did not know the respective identities. He had access to the raw reports as submitted by the AA group which he partly assembled and cross-checked for reporting. I once noticed that he went through a large number of P/reports - these reports are locked away by CC 3, and only CC 3 and myself have keys - but the matter turned out harmless because he assembled a long-breath political report. He had access to the raw reports, except any type of special investigation, by the PP group. He personally received the reports submitted by HH 1. Although the theoretical possibility exists, that he especially during weekends had the looks - these are Yale type locks - opened, I did not notice.

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any change in the way how I had papers laid out - this is a habit of mine which enables me to check in connection with my photographic memory. He especially hardly could have had access to any personnel files which I keep completely separate in a steel box with a Yale lock and to which only I have access. I further saw to it that his connection with XX 1 did not grow to friendly, whereby XX 1 would have reported to me had he noticed anything suspicious going on in the former office where he and his family lived.

d- Possible intelligence connections:

His contact with Hoettl, which seems to date back to the time prior to the "Anschluss".

His contact with Franz ~~STEINDL~~ and through him with AUNER and ~~MANDL~~.

A frequent personal contact with (professor) RASCHHOFER of Braunau, allegedly based on CC 2's work for HERDER Verlag.
A reoccurring with (professor) Taras ~~BOBODAJKEWICZ~~.

8. When the problem of a leakage-possibility first came up in fall 1951 I ran a long term check on CC 2's mail and connections which then did not disclose anything derogative.

9. As a preventive measure I suggest to commence immediately with a reputation campaign against CC 2 starting off with church circles through EE 1, where his moral life would give a good explanation.

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